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ABSTRACT
In his recent article, Professor Richard Squire offers a provocative theory
in which he claims the underlying claimants in shareholder litigation against
corporate policyholders are overcompensated due to what he describes as
“cramdown” settlements, under which insurers are forced to settle due to the
“duty to contribute” that arises under multi-layered directors and officers
(“D&O”) insurance programs. He also offers a novel idea regarding how this
problem could be fixed by what he refers to as “segmented” settlements in
which each insurer and the policyholder would be allowed to settle separately
and consider only its own interests in doing so.
In this Response to that article, I further explore the assumptions
underlying Professor Squire’s claims. I also explore the complexities
associated with implementing a segmented settlement scheme because such a
scheme is not consistent with the existing policy language or common law
that has developed. Under the existing policy language, insurers are only
contractually obligated to contribute to settlements that are reasonable based
upon the policyholder’s expected liability at trial. Consequently, the policy
language regarding settlements would need to be rewritten to allow insurers to
consider only their own financial interests when deciding whether to settle. In
addition, in order to implement a segmented settlement scheme, the
exhaustion requirement that currently exists in many excess policies would
need to be removed to allow insurers to settle for less than their full policy
limits. Such changes would have a dramatic impact on the structure of
insurance programs and the risk transferring function of insurance because
excess insurers’ exposure would increase while policyholders may be forced to
become self-insured and fund significant portions of settlements. Such
changes would also create some practical difficulties regarding the trials of
cases in which the policyholder settled but some of the insurers had not
because such cases would proceed without a defendant, the policyholder. The
Response closes by addressing the issue of whether segmented settlements
would be appropriate for other lines of corporate insurance.
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INTRODUCTION

I

N his recent article, 1 Professor Richard Squire offers a provocative theory
in which he claims the underlying claimants in shareholder litigation against
corporate policyholders are overcompensated under “cramdown”
settlements. Cramdown settlements are forced on insurers due to what he
calls a “duty to contribute” that arises under multi-layered directors and
officers (“D&O”) insurance programs. He also offers a novel idea regarding
how this problem could be fixed: “segmented” settlements.
In essence, Professor Squire claims that the existence of multi-layered
D&O insurance programs makes policyholders “overeager to settle risky
lawsuits.” 2 Insurers are then forced to settle such lawsuits in “cramdown”
settlements for more than the lawsuits are actuarially worth, due to an
obligation he names “the duty to contribute.” 3 This dynamic, he further
claims, causes the overcompensation of the underlying claimants. 4 As a
result, the real costs of lawsuits against corporate policyholders are
camouflaged from shareholders in the form of higher premiums charged by
insurers in an effort to recoup the excessive settlement amounts they are
forced to pay. 5 Professor Squire then discusses the idea of whether this
alleged problem could be solved by allowing insurers and policyholders to
each act in their own self-interest and settle individually with the underlying
claimants. 6 Under this segmented approach to settlements, each party could
settle for any amount it negotiates. The underlying plaintiffs would then
proceed to trial only against the parties that had not settled. 7
In his article, Professor Squire offers numerous important insights
regarding shareholder litigation and collective settlements, such as coining the
phrase “duty to contribute” to describe insurers’ obligations to contribute to
settlements that implicate their layers of coverage. 8 He is also the first scholar
to identify the risk stemming from financial incentives that certain excess
insurers may have to pay more than the actuarial value of cases in certain
circumstances in order to settle. 9 Rather than focus on the contributions
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Richard Squire, How Collective Settlements Camouflage the Costs of Shareholder Lawsuits, 62 DUKE
L.J. 1 (2012).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 27–29.

592

Virginia Law & Business Review

7:589 (2013)

Professor Squire has made to insurance law scholarship in his article,
however, this Response addresses the assumptions that underlie Professor
Squire’s claims and the issues that would arise if a segmented settlement
scheme were implemented. This Response counsels against the
implementation of a segmented settlement scheme due to the extensive
changes to the existing policy language and law that would be required, along
with the collateral negative consequences that would flow from such a
scheme.
This Response is divided into three parts. Part One addresses the claim
that the “duty to contribute” results in “cramdown” settlements in which
insurers are forced to settle for unreasonable amounts and the underlying
claimants are overcompensated as a result. As noted above, Professor Squire
has identified a theoretical situation that could arise in some circumstances
where excess insurers may be tempted to pay more than they are contractually
obligated in order to settle. I seek to demonstrate that, although it is
theoretically a risk in certain circumstances, in practice the situation does not
actually occur.
Part Two addresses the complexities and problems that would be created
if a segmented settlement scheme were implemented. These problems range
from the difficulties of conducting “empty chair” trials to the extensive
changes that would need to be made to the existing policy language and law.
Part Two also discusses public policy concerns that would be implicated by a
segmented settlement scheme. Finally, Part Two considers whether the
benefits of a segmented settlement scheme would outweigh the problems
such a system would create.
Part Three addresses whether a segmented settlement scheme would be
appropriate for other lines of corporate insurance. In discussing this issue, I
draw upon my own twenty years of experience litigating and trying insurance
disputes, as well as the case law. I use two actual experiences a Fortune 100
company had with its insurers regarding product liability claims under
commercial general liability (“CGL”) insurance policies to illustrate the
settlement dynamic that typically occurs.
I. ANALYSIS OF THE RISK OF “CRAMDOWN” SETTLEMENTS AND
OVERCOMPENSATION OF PLAINTIFFS UNDER THE EXISTING POLICY
LANGUAGE AND LAW
The central premise of Professor Squire’s article – that policyholders and
excess insurers are allowed under the existing policy language and law to
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“cramdown” unreasonable settlements on primary insurers that results in the
overcompensation of the underlying claimants – is a completely novel idea
that demands discussion and consideration. At its core, Professor Squire's
insight involves recognizing that by forcing a primary insurer to make the
portion of its limits above its own expected trial liability available for
settlement, in effect this "duty to contribute" gives the excess insurer the
"benefit" of that amount to use towards settlement. As a result, the excess
insurer, acting in its own rational self-interest, may be incentivized to overpay.
This dynamic is, however, a situation that insurers themselves have
created under the policy language they drafted. Indeed, the duty to contribute
is simply the enforcement of the policy language under the specific facts of
each case. With that said, the actual risk of excess insurers overpaying is, as
will be shown below, absent as a practical matter and becomes more and
more remote as a theoretical matter as the plaintiffs’ chances of success
decrease and/or the policyholder’s potential liability increases beyond its
coverage limits.
Under the express terms of D&O policies and many other types of
excess liability policies, the decision to settle is made by the policyholder. 10
While the policies also require that the policyholder obtain the consent of
each insurer that would be required to pay any portion of the settlement,
“such consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.” 11 This means that insurers
are only required to contribute to reasonable settlements. If the policyholder
settles for an unreasonable amount, then the insurer is not obligated to
10

11

See, e.g., Fuller-Austin Installation Co. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 135 Cal. App. 4th 958, 982
(2006) (considering a policy which allowed the policyholder to decide whether to settle
but required the excess insurer’s consent, which means “‘[a]n excess insurance company
has a duty to accept reasonable settlements on its policyholder's behalf’; ‘[e]ven if an
excess insurance company has not denied coverage or refused to defend, the insurance
company has a duty to accept a reasonable settlement’”) (quoting Fuller-Austin
Installation Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., No. BC116835, 2002 WL 31005090, at *18
(Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 2002)); Taylor v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 978 P.2d 740,
747 (Haw. 1999) (“An insurer may not use [a consent-to-settle] clause to block settlement
unreasonably . . . .”) (quoting Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Nayerahamadi, 593 F.
Supp. 216, 218 (E.D. Pa. 1984)); 14 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON
INSURANCE § 203:37 (3d ed. 2011) (“Liability policies typically contain a consent to settle
clause under which the insured is not permitted to enter into settlement with a tortfeasor
without the consent of the insurer. Where the policy contains such a clause, the insured's
failure to obtain prior consent from the insurer constitutes a breach of a condition of the
insurance contract and thereby forfeits coverage under the policy unless the insured can
show that the insurer effectively waived the requirement of consent by the insurer's . . .
unreasonable refusal to consent.”).
E.g., Hilco Capital, LP v. Fed. Ins. Co., 978 A.2d 174, 179 (Del. 2009); Vigilant Ins. Co. v.
Bear Stearns Cos., 10 N.Y.3d 170, 177 (N.Y. 2008).
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contribute to it. The question of whether a settlement is reasonable is based
upon the expected exposure of the policyholder at trial, not each individual
insurer’s expected exposure. 12 With respect to excess insurance and many
types of liability insurance, such as D&O insurance, this rule of
“reasonableness” is not a judicial creation under which the policyholder
defends itself and decides whether to settle. 13 Rather, it is a contractual
obligation set forth in the very policies that the insurers themselves drafted.
Thus, by contractually agreeing to consent to settlements that are reasonable,
insurers have agreed to consider the policyholder’s interests when the
settlement decision is made, not solely their own financial self-interest. 14
12

13

14

See Squire, supra note 1, at 19; Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal. 1967)
(finding that, in determining reasonableness, the question to be answered is whether "a
prudent insurer without policy limits would have accepted the settlement offer"); Wierck
v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 456 N.W.2d 191, 195 (Iowa 1990) ("If, but for the policy
limits, the insurer would settle for an offered amount, it is obligated to do so . . . .”).
Under many types of liability insurance, such as auto insurance and homeowners
insurance, the insurer has the right and obligation to defend the policyholder and the
insurer has the right to settle cases asserted against the policyholder. Because the insurer
controls the defense and settlement decisions under such policies and has the ability to
place the policyholder's assets at risk for judgments that exceed the policy's limits, the
insurer is in a fiduciary role with respect to the policyholder. Consequently, courts have
interpreted the right to settle provisions in such policies to contain an implied duty to act
fairly and in good faith, which means the insurer must accept reasonable settlement offers
that are within the policy's limits. See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, Judicial Limitations on the Discretion
of Liability Insurers to Settle or Litigate: An Economic Critique, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1345, 1349
(1994); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty To Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1117–26 (1990); PPG
Indus. Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 659 (Cal. 1999) (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(“Pursuant to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which is implied by law in every
liability insurance policy, the insurer has a duty to make reasonable efforts to settle a claim
against its insured by the insured's victim – which accords with the public policy favoring
settlement.") (citations omitted); Birth Ctr. v. St. Paul Cos., 787 A.2d 376, 389 (Pa. 2001)
("Today, we hold that where an insurer acts in bad faith, by unreasonably refusing to settle
a claim, it breaches its contractual duty to act in good faith and its fiduciary duty to its
insured."). That is not the situation at issue in Professor Squire’s article or in this
Response. Unlike policies in which the insurer defends the case and controls the
settlement decision and courts have created a duty to settle as a fiduciary duty and an
implied contractual obligation, the obligation to consent to reasonable settlements under
many excess policies and some lines of liability insurance, such as D&O insurance, is
specifically set forth in the language of the policies. See Hilco Capital, 978 A.2d at 179;
Vigilant Ins. Co., 10 N.Y.3d at 177; Crisci, 426 P.2d at 176; Wierck, 456 N.W.2d at 195;
Squire, supra note 1, at 19.
Professor Squire acknowledges this contractual obligation in his article, but then
discounts the power of the requirement that a settlement must be reasonable before an
insurer must consent to it in his analysis by claiming insurers nonetheless are somehow
forced to settle for presumably unreasonable amounts in what he describes as
“cramdown” settlements. See Squire, supra note 1, at 19–21, 28. Notably, he does not
provide any examples of unreasonable "cramdown" settlements that allegedly have
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Does this contractual arrangement allow excess insurers to “cramdown”
unreasonable settlements on primary insurers? No, it actually should prevent
such occurrences. Does it create a financial incentive for excess insurers to
overpay in order to settle? Theoretically, yes, in some limited circumstances,
but in practice, no.
To understand these answers, consider the simple hypothetical that
Professor Squire uses in his article. 15 A policyholder is facing a claim with $5
million in damages. The policyholder’s primary insurance has $2 million in
limits. The excess insurer provides $3 million in limits. There is a 50% chance
of a defense verdict on liability. Under this scenario, Professor Squire and I
both agree that the policyholder’s expected liability would be $2.5 million (0.5
x $5M = $2.5M). 16 Because the primary insurer has contractually agreed to
pay the first $2 million of the policyholder’s liability, it would be reasonable
for it to pay the full $2 million of its limits if a reasonable settlement demand
exceeding $2 million is made and thus, a “cramdown” situation would not
exist. Would the primary insurer nonetheless be economically incentivized to
overpay the plaintiff in order to settle? No, its maximum liability is capped at
its policy limit of $2 million so it would have neither a contractual nor an
economic reason to pay more than $2 million.
Due to the fact the primary insurer’s expected trial liability would only be
$1 million (0.5 x $2M (the policy limits) = $1M), but it is required to pay the
full $2 million of its limits if the case can be settled for the reasonable
settlement value of $2.5 million, does this system result in the transfer of
wealth, what Professor Squire refers to as “T” in his formulas, 17 from the
primary insurer to the excess insurer, as Professor Squire suggests? 18 No.
Under the existing policy language and law, the reasonableness of the
settlement is based on the overall expected liability of the policyholder, not
each individual insurer’s expected trial liability. 19 Indeed, due to the
requirement in excess policies that all of the underlying insurance be
exhausted before the excess policy has an obligation to pay, 20 the primary

15
16
17
18
19
20

occurred despite the contractual limitation that insurers are only required to pay
reasonable settlements.
See Squire, supra note 1, at 24–25, 28.
Id. at 25.
See, e.g., id. at 29.
See id. at 29.
See id. at 19; Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal. 1967); Wierck v. Grinnell Mut.
Reins. Co., 456 N.W.2d 191, 195 (Iowa 1990).
See, e.g., 2 ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 6:45 (5th ed. 2012)
(“An excess insurer is liable only to the extent that the covered portions of a judgment or
settlement exceed the primary insurance.”); Utica Nat’l Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Fid. & Cas. Co.
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insurer is paid a much higher premium in exchange for its promise to pay its
full limits if the reasonable settlement value of the case from the
policyholder’s perspective exceeds the primary policy’s limits.21 Thus, there is
no transfer of wealth from the primary insurer to the excess insurer. The
primary insurer contractually agreed to pay more than its expected trial
liability in order to settle and was paid a premium commensurate with that
agreement.
Does the same analysis apply to the excess insurers? No, they have
different contractual obligations and financial incentives than the primary
insurer. Under this hypothetical, the excess insurer would contractually be
required to pay $0.5 million to settle because the reasonable settlement value
of the case is $2.5 million and the primary insurer would be required to pay
the $2 million limits of its policy if a settlement for $2.5 million were possible.
Would the excess insurer nonetheless have an economic incentive to pay
more than $0.5 million to settle if the plaintiff is insisting on more than $2.5
million to settle? Theoretically, yes; Professor Squire has identified this as a
problem. 22 Because there is a 50% chance that the excess insurer could be
required to pay its full limits of $3 million at trial, the excess insurer has an
expected trial liability of $1.5 million (0.5 x $3M = $1.5M). Thus, although the
excess insurer would contractually be obligated to pay only $.5 million to

21

22

of N.Y, 812 S.W.2d 656, 659–60 (Tex. App. 1991), writ denied, (Oct. 23, 1991) (explaining
that excess insurers are not required to pay any amount until primary insurance coverage
is exhausted); Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 877 F. Supp. 1170, 1175–77, (N.D. Ill.
1995) ("Excess insurance 'kicks in' to provide additional coverage once the policy limits of
other available insurance are exhausted. . . . The protections of excess insurance does not
begin until those of the primary policy end; all primary insurance must be exhausted
before liability is triggered on the excess insurance, regardless of how the excess insurance
is created. . . . Excess policies . . . are not automatically triggered by an event; they are not
triggered until underlying insurance is exhausted. By the terms of the policy, an insured is
not entitled to recover from an excess insurer until underlying insurance is exhausted.").
See, e.g., ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE
LAW 976 (5th ed. 2012) (“[P]rimary insurers charge higher premiums than do excess and
umbrella carriers. In contrast, relieved of primary insurance burdens and shielded from
frequent losses by the presence of underlying primary insurance, excess and umbrella
insurers charge relatively low premiums when compared with the amount of risk
insured."); Michael M. Marick, Excess Insurance: An Overview of General Principles and Current
Issues, 24 TORT & INS. L.J. 715, 718 (1989) (“Most major corporations purchase multiple
layers of excess insurance to cover losses potentially aggregating in the millions of dollars.
The premium paid by the insured for each successive layer of coverage is normally
proportionately less expensive than for the immediate underlying layer. The lower
premium charged for following form excess insurance is based upon both the decreased
risk of a judgment or settlement within higher layers of coverage and the absence of a
duty to defend the insured.”) (citations omitted).
See Squire, supra note 1, at 28–29.
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accomplish a reasonable settlement, it economically would be incentivized to
pay up to $1.5 million to settle.
This hypothetical reveals both the strengths and weaknesses in Professor
Squire’s analysis that lead him to the incorrect conclusion that the current
rules regarding settlement result in the overcompensation of plaintiffs. 23
Professor Squire is correct that a temptation to overpay may exist in such
circumstances; 24 however, it is the excess insurer, not the primary insurer,
which has the financial incentive to pay more to settle when one considers the
reasonableness of the settlement from the perspective of each insurer’s
expected trial liability and its existing contractual obligations. The reasonable
amount for the excess insurer to pay to settle under the current policy
language and rules would be $0.5 million, where the policyholder’s expected
trial liability is $2.5 million ($2 million from the primary insurer plus $0.5
million from the excess insurer). But the excess insurer’s expected trial liability
is $1.5 million (0.5 x $3M = $1.5M) so it would have an economic incentive,
but not a contractual obligation, to pay more than $0.5 million in order to
settle.
With that said, situations in which excess insurers actually would be
tempted to overpay are more theoretical than real. In practice, excess insurers
are not eager to settle. Instead, they are the most reluctant insurers to settle. 25
23

24
25

The assertion that shareholders are overcompensated in shareholder lawsuits is not
without controversy. The average settlement for such lawsuits between 2003 and 2008 was $45.1
million. See TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW
LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 22 (2010). Although that
figure may sound like a lot of money, it represents less than 3% of the average damages actually
sought in such cases. Id. at 8.
See Squire, supra note 1, at 25–26.
Excess insurers, which receive smaller premiums from the policyholder than the primary
insurer and may not have any liability until tens or hundreds of millions of dollars of
underlying insurance has been exhausted, typically are the insurers that are most skeptical
of the reasonableness of proposed settlements that implicate their policies. Consequently,
they often refuse to settle and then become the defendants in subsequent coverage
litigation brought by the policyholder or underlying claimants after the underlying case has
been settled without the excess insurers’ participation. See, e.g., Michael F. Aylward, Paying
to Play: What Does It Mean to Exhaust Underlying Insurance, 54 DRI FOR THE DEF., no. 5, May
2012, at 27, 28–30 (discussing cases where excess insurers have battled in courtrooms for
years in an effort to avoid paying when the underlying insurance arguably has not been
exhausted); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 99C-12-253 JTV,
2006 WL2338045 *1, *4 (Del. Super. Ct. July 31, 2006), aff’d, Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 933 A.2d 1250 (Del. 2007) (describing a policyholder
who funded over $239 million of defense and settlement costs associated with underlying
litigation where excess insurers refused to settle and then litigated with its excess insurers
for over a decade in order to recover the amounts paid in the underlying litigation);
Comerica Inc. v. Zurich Amer. Ins. Co., 498 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1034 (E.D. Mich. 2007)
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Indeed, they often either do not pay their full policy limits or must be sued in
order to force them to pay anything. 26 This happens because they often
disagree with the policyholder’s and/or underlying plaintiffs’ assessment of
the plaintiffs’ chances of success at trial and because of the requirement that
all of the underlying insurance first be exhausted. 27 They also simply do not
fear the risk of being held liable for more than their policy limits for bad faith
refusal to settle if a judgment is entered against the policyholder for more
than the limits of the policyholder’s insurance program. 28 This is because
they know the policyholder, which controls settlement, will settle the case
before exposing the corporation to an enormous uninsured loss. 29 Indeed,
due to the enormous financial downside of shareholder trials for the
policyholder and the unwanted negative publicity associated with such cases,
almost no shareholder cases go to trial. 30
Excess insurers also insist on a discount for their coverage defenses based
on policy exclusions, such as the fraud and unjust enrichment exclusions,
which often potentially apply in shareholder lawsuits and become even
stronger defenses if the case goes to trial and the shareholders are able to
introduce evidence of the policyholder’s deliberate misconduct and obtain a
judgment. 31 Consequently, because of their coverage defenses and knowledge

26
27

28

29
30
31

(exhibiting an instance where an excess insurer successfully argued that it was not required
to pay anything where the settlement with the primary insurer was for less than the
policy’s full limits).
Comerica, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 1034. See also Part III.
See E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 2006 WL2338045 at *4; Comerica, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 1034;
United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Lay, 577 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1978); Aylward, supra note 25, at
27, 28–30; BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 167–69, 187; infra text accompanying
note 42.
Proving an insurer acted in bad faith is not an easy task. Most of the cases in which the
policyholder successfully proves the insurer acted in bad faith involve more insurer
misconduct than a simple refusal to accept a reasonable settlement demand within policy
limits. See, e.g., Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967) (affirming jury verdict of
bad faith where the insurer, in addition to refusing to accept a settlement demand within
policy limits, refused to settle even though the policyholder, a 70-year old widow, offered
to contribute to the settlement and ultimately committed suicide after becoming indigent
while attempting to satisfy the judgment in excess of the policy’s limits entered against
her); Birth Ctr. v. St. Paul Cos., 787 A.2d 376 (Pa. 2001) (affirming jury verdict of bad
faith in a medical malpractice case involving an injured baby where the insurer refused to
settle within policy limits due to its corporate practice of trying, instead of settling, all
“bad baby cases” despite the insurer-appointed defense counsel recommending settlement
and the presiding trial judge informing the insurer that it was acting in bad faith by
refusing to settle).
BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 142, 167–69, 187.
Id. at 160, 167–69, 187.
Id. at 178-79, 186–90, 198.
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that policyholders cannot afford to risk an enormous uninsured verdict at
trial, excess insurers routinely insist upon receiving discounts off their policy
limits and policyholders effectively have to pay a portion of the various excess
insurers’ layers of coverage to the underlying claimants in order to settle
cases. 32 Thus, instead of having an incentive to overpay in order to settle
under the current policy language and laws, 33 more incentives need to be
created to pressure excess insurers to pay reasonable amounts to settle
because the existing incentives are inadequate. Awarding the policyholder
attorneys’ fees if the policyholder is forced to fund a reasonable settlement
itself and then sue its excess insurers for reimbursement would be an example
of a way that the law could be changed to encourage insurers to settle. 34
Moreover, even if an excess insurer theoretically were willing to pay more
to settle than they contractually are obligated to do, the only time it would
have an incentive to do so is when its expected trial liability plus the limits of
32
33

34

Id. at 10, 143, 179, 198.
Although Professor Squire discusses some of these facts in Part IV of his article, his
discussion does not reconcile how excess insurers that refuse to settle and/or insist on
significant discounts off their policy limits based on their coverage defenses and differing
assessments of the plaintiffs’ chances of success at trial are nonetheless forced to overpay
under “cramdown” settlements. Indeed, he offers the Second Circuit case of Schwartz v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 539 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2008), as his leading example of a case in which
a “cramdown” settlement allegedly occurred and the court allegedly overlooked the
overcompensation hazard that he claims exists under the current policy language and law.
See Squire, supra note 1, at 65. Instead of being a “cramdown” settlement situation,
Schwartz is actually an example of why more incentives need to be created to force insurers
to accept reasonable settlement demands. In Schwartz, the policyholder had $50 million of
D&O insurance and the insurers refused to offer more than $5 million to settle, which
forced the policyholder to go to trial. Schwartz, 539 F.3d at 139. Just before the end of
trial, the policyholder agreed to settle for $20 million without his insurers’ consent. Id. The
policyholder subsequently sued his insurers for reimbursement and a jury found that the
insurers unreasonably refused to consent to the settlement. On appeal, the Second Circuit
held that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict. Id. at 145. In short, Schwartz is not a
“cramdown” settlement case. The policyholder settled for $30 million less than the limits
of the insurance program and the policyholder had to fund the settlement himself. After
funding the settlement, the policyholder then had to: 1) sue all of his insurers to seek
reimbursement, and 2) convince a jury and the Second Circuit that the insurers acted
unreasonably in refusing to consent to the settlement. That is a far cry from a situation
where the primary and lower layer insurers were coerced by the excess insurers and
policyholder to accept an unreasonably high settlement demand in order to avoid trial.
See, e.g., WINDT, supra note 20, at § 9:24 (“There are, in short, sound public policy reasons
for allowing an insured some type of ‘extra’ award when an insurance company
unreasonably refuses to . . . indemnify the insured, forcing him or her to go to the
expense of establishing the company's error by means of litigation . . . . The most
appropriate relief, therefore, when an insurance company has acted unreasonably, is an
award of attorney's fees.”).
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the underlying insurance are greater than the policyholder’s expected trial
liability. That scenario could only arise when the alleged damages are within,
or do not greatly exceed, the coverage limits and the plaintiffs’ chances of
success at trial are relatively high. The following formula reveals when the
temptation to overpay could arise:
(UL + UI) x P < UL
Under this formula, UL represents the underlying policy limits, P
represents the probability of the plaintiffs winning at trial, and UI represents
the uninsured exposure of the policyholder based on the amount of alleged
damages that exceed the policy limits.
Similarly, to put the formula in Professor Squire’s terms where he calls
the risk of overpayment a “transfer,” 35 the formula can simply be stated as
follows:
(UI x P) < T
Under this alternative formula, UI represents the uninsured portion of
the damages, P represents the probability of the plaintiffs winning at trial, and
T represents the amount of the potential overpayment.
To illustrate the limited circumstances in which the theoretical temptation
to overpay could arise, consider again Professor Squire’s example that we
have been discussing. If the alleged damages were increased to $7 million, but
all of the other assumptions remained the same, then the excess insurer’s
temptation to overpay would disappear. This is because the policyholder’s
expected liability would be $3.5M (0.5 x $7M = $3.5M) and the excess insurer
would be unwilling to pay more than $1.5M (0.5 x $3M) in addition to the
primary insurer’s $2M in limits to settle. Consequently, the reasonable
settlement value of the case from the policyholder’s and excess insurer’s
perspectives becomes the same.
Of course, in shareholder lawsuits, the alleged damages typically far
exceed the limits of coverage, even though data comparing the policyholder’s
total amount of insurance versus the alleged damages is not available. Also,
the plaintiffs’ chances of success at trial are often relatively low, so the
temptation for excess insurers to pay more than they are contractually
obligated to do is not a common occurrence. 36 In addition, in the odd case in
which such a scenario could arise, only the highest layer of coverage
implicated by the settlement demand would be presented with this temptation
due to the way corporate insurance programs are structured. This is because
the policyholder’s expected trial liability must exceed each of the lower layers
35
36

See Squire, supra note 1, at 29.
See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 142.
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of coverage before the higher layer of coverage would be obligated to
contribute anything to the settlement. Thus, it is a phenomenon that would
only impact the highest layer of coverage in the insurance program.37
In sum, “cramdown” settlements should not occur under the existing
policy language and law because only reasonable settlements must be
accepted, and the reasonableness of the settlement is based on the
policyholder’s expected liability. Although the risk of overcompensation by
the highest layer excess insurer theoretically could arise in some very limited
circumstances, the risk is not created by the contractual or legal obligations of
the insurers. In practice, excess insurers do not overpay plaintiffs in order to
settle because of the exhaustion requirement in their policies, their coverage
defenses, and their differing views regarding the plaintiffs’ chances of success
at trial. Instead, they resist settling and insist on discounts off their policies’
limits in order to settle because they do not face significant downside risks if
they refuse to settle.
II. ANALYSIS OF CERTAIN ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF A SEGMENTED SETTLEMENT SCHEME
In this Part, the theoretical solution that Professor Squire sets forth to
address the alleged problem of “cramdown” settlements and the
overcompensation of plaintiffs is discussed in two sections. The first section
discusses the practical and legal problems that the implementation of a
segmented settlement scheme would present. The second section discusses
whether the claimed benefits of a segmented settlement scheme – less
compensation to plaintiffs and lower premiums – warrant changing to such a
scheme.
A. The Problems and Complexities Presented by the Implementation
of a Segmented Settlement Scheme
1. Practical Problems Associated with a Segmented Settlement Scheme
A segmented approach to settlements would present a number of serious
practical problems, some of which are acknowledged by Professor Squire in his
article.38 Under a segmented approach, the policyholder and each insurer would be
allowed to settle separately with the underlying plaintiffs, and the underlying
37
38

See infra Figure 1; BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 52–54.
See Squire, supra note 1, at Part IV.
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plaintiffs would then proceed to trial against the insurers that refused to settle.
Under such a scenario, the underlying case would be tried against an empty chair –
the policyholder that settled with a full release.39 Of course, in shareholder cases,
much of the relevant trial evidence would be documents and testimony from the
directors and officers of the policyholder, particularly because shareholders need to
prove that the corporation made intentional, or at least reckless,
misrepresentations.40 Also remember that one of the reasons policyholders desire
to settle shareholder suits is to avoid the negative publicity associated with a public
trial, including the alleged misconduct of its corporate management that allegedly
resulted in the bilking of the company’s shareholders. 41
With those facts in mind, what incentive would the policyholder have to appear
at trial after it has settled with a full release? Since the policyholder has paid to get
out of the case when its insurers refused to settle, what incentive would it have to
cooperate with its insurers during discovery or at trial? 42 Why would the
policyholder spend time and resources preparing for a trial in which its directors
and officers would be exposed to cross examination designed to prove that they
defrauded their own shareholders? The directors and officers would be confronted
with every bad document that the shareholders’ counsel could uncover, which
would then be published in newspapers and televised over and over again. With a
lot of downside and nothing to gain at trial, the policyholder would want nothing to
do with it. Consequently, the shareholder plaintiffs and non-settling insurers would
need to subpoena the policyholder’s witnesses and documents, which the
policyholder would resist with all legal means available.
39

40
41
42

Cases in which a plaintiff pursues a policyholder’s insurers without the policyholder as a
defendant in the case are not empty chair cases because such actions typically occur after a
judgment has been entered against the policyholder or the policyholder has stipulated to
liability and assigned its insurance rights to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Pruyn v. Agric. Ins. Co.,
36 Cal. App. 4th 500, 515, 522–23 (1995) (noting that so long as the judgment amount is
reasonable and not the result of fraud or collusion, the policyholder can settle by agreeing
to the entry of a consent judgment with a covenant not to execute against the
policyholder where the insurer breached the duty to defend); Ayers v. C & D Gen.
Contractors, 269 F. Supp. 2d 911, 917 (W.D. Ky. 2003) (same).
See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 32.
See id. at 160.
Under existing law and the current policy language, the policyholder is obligated to
cooperate with its insurers. See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 21, at 603–10. If a
policyholder's failure to cooperate with the insurer materially prejudices the insurer's
defense of the case, then coverage is forfeited. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 21, at
607–08. Although Professor Squire does not address this issue, presumably that obligation
also would either be removed or ignored under a segmented settlement scheme because
the policyholder would be able to act solely in its own self-interest and settle while its
insurers remained in the case.
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Further, unless the policy language and case law were changed, the shareholder
claimants should expect that as soon as some of the underlying insurers and
policyholder settle, the remaining insurers would move for summary judgment
based on current case law that holds an excess insurer’s liability is extinguished once
the policyholder settles with a full release.43 In addition, the excess insurers would
likely move for summary judgment based on case law that holds a settlement of the
underlying insurance for less than the full policy limits does not satisfy the
exhaustion requirement of the policies. 44 The non-settling insurers also would
move for summary judgment on the basis that the policyholder’s failure to
cooperate in the defense of the case should result in the forfeiture of coverage. 45
Finally, with Louisiana being the most notable exception, very few states allow

43

44

45

See, e.g., United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Lay, 577 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1978) (finding an excess
insurer had no liability where the primary insurer settled for less than its full policy limits
and the policyholder agreed to the entry of a consent judgment, under which the claimant
could only execute against the excess insurer because the policyholder effectively had
been released under the consent judgment and had no liability to the underlying claimant
for which the excess insurer could be liable).
See, e.g., Comerica Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 498 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1028 (E.D. Mich.
2007) (finding an excess insurer had no liability where underlying insurance was settled for
less than the full policy limits); Qualcomm, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s,
London, 161 Cal. App. 4th 184, 194 (2008) (same). A policyholder, unlike an insurer,
often is able to successfully argue it has satisfied the exhaustion requirement for primary
or lower layers of insurance in situations if the loss exceeds the amount of the underlying
insurance or the policyholder has paid a settlement to the underlying claimant that
exceeds the limits of the underlying insurance. This is true even if the policyholder settles
with some of the lower layer insurers for less than the full policy limits before pursuing
the excess insurers for reimbursement. In such circumstances, the limits of the underlying
insurance are deemed to have been exhausted because the policyholder has actually
suffered a loss in an amount greater than the underlying insurance’s limits and/or paid the
full amount of the limits to the underlying claimant. See, e.g., Zeig v. Mass. Bonding & Ins.
Co., 23 F.2d 665, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1928) (finding that the policyholder satisfied the
exhaustion requirement in an excess insurer’s policy even though the policyholder settled
with the primary insurer for less than the full limits because the loss exceeded the full
limits of the primary policy); Koppers Co., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440,
1454 (3d Cir. 1996) (same); Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Aon Risk Servs., Inc., 356 F.3d
850, 859 (8th Cir. 2004) (same).
See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 42, at 607–08. Of course, if a policyholder settles with
the plaintiffs and obtains a full release, then the policyholder would not care whether its
failure to cooperate results in the forfeiture of coverage under the remaining policies. The
plaintiffs would, however, care because they would lose that potential coverage if the
policyholder breaches the duty to cooperate. Nonetheless, due to the inherent conflicts, it
is hard to imagine a scenario in which the policyholder would be required to cooperate
with the remaining insurers in their efforts to defeat the plaintiffs’ claims when doing so
would preserve coverage for the benefit of the very plaintiffs whose claim the
policyholder is also being asked to help defeat.
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direct actions by claimants against insurers.46 Consequently, unless numerous laws
were changed, once the policyholder settles, the remaining insurers likely would
move for the dismissal of the case as well.
In short, as Professor Squire correctly notes, one should not expect
shareholders, shareholders’ counsel or policyholders to support a segmented
settlement scheme, particularly where the goal of the system is to drive down the
amount shareholders and their counsel recover and to shift more of the
settlement’s costs onto policyholders.47 Nor, as is discussed in the next section,
would such an approach likely be attractive to judges because, instead of promoting
settlements, it likely would lead to additional litigation and motions practice in
situations where the actual defendant in the litigation – the policyholder – is no
longer even a party.
2. Public Policy Considerations Regarding Segmented Settlements
It also is worth observing that a segmented approach to settlement is
inconsistent with well-established public policy that favors settlements in
order to avoid the expense and delay caused by litigation. 48 As many courts
and commentators have noted, “settlements produce a substantial savings in
judicial resources and thus aid in controlling backlog in the courts.” 49
Another advantage of settlements is that they provide “greater control over
the outcome [of a dispute] and its timing.”50 Consequently, settlements enjoy
46
47

48

49
50

See, e.g., Mark Mese, Direct Action Statutes, 15 COMPREHENSIVE GEN. LIAB. REP. S520, at 3–
10 (Int’l Risk Mgmt. Inst. ed. 2003).
See Squire, supra note 1, at Part IV. Professor Squire opines that a segmented settlement
scheme would be beneficial to shareholders because the overall cost to the company
would be lower under such a system. The plaintiff shareholders nonetheless might not
endorse such a scheme because one of the scheme’s goals would be to lower the
compensation they would receive. See Squire, supra note 1, at 41–45.
See, e.g., Margaret M. Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the Supreme Court, 48 HASTINGS L.J.
9, 74 (1996); Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 595 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Settlement
agreements are to be encouraged because they promote the amicable resolution of
disputes and lighten the increasing load of litigation faced by the federal courts. In
addition to the conservation of judicial resources, the parties may also gain significantly
from avoiding the costs and risks of a lengthy and complex trial.”) (citations omitted);
Murchison v. Grand Cypress Hotel Corp., 13 F.3d 1483, 1486 (11th Cir. 1994) (“We favor
and encourage settlements in order to conserve judicial resources.”); Miller v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 155 P.3d 1278, 1281 (Mont. 2007) (“The declared public policy of
this State is to encourage settlement and avoid unnecessary litigation. . . . Settlement
eliminates cost, stress, and waste of judicial resources.”).
Am. Sec. Vanlines, Inc. v. Gallagher, 782 F.2d 1056, 1060 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 405 (2009).
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the enthusiastic support of courts because they help alleviate the congestion
of court dockets. 51
Although Professor Squire disagrees, 52 if adopted, a segmented
settlement scheme would discourage settlements and encourage trials because
insurers would have little reason to settle in many, if not most, cases since
their potential liability at trial would never exceed their policy limits. Their
expected liability would also always be lower than the full policy limits unless
the policyholder’s liability went undisputed. Consequently, if the
reasonableness of settlements were analyzed on an individual insurer-byinsurer basis without regard for the overall expected liability of the
policyholder, and if insurers had no liability for refusing to settle, then
insurers would have little incentive to settle unless they were offered
incredible discounts off their policy limits. This is because they would lose the
investment income they could earn on the amounts paid to settle by waiting
until a final judgment is entered after a trial. Further, their coverage defenses
based on the unjust enrichment and deliberate misconduct exclusions may
completely eliminate their coverage obligation if they wait for a judgment in
the case, so their incentive to wait for trial would continue, as it currently
does. In addition, with each insurer independently evaluating the plaintiffs’
chances of success at trial, at least some insurers would assess those chances
differently than the plaintiffs, further increasing the likelihood that some
insurers would refuse to settle. Thus, a segmented settlement scheme would
be contrary to the public policy that encourages settlements.
A segmented settlement scheme also runs afoul of the long-standing
public policy to enforce contracts and require insurers to honor the terms of
the policies that they draft and for which they accept handsome premiums. 53
Insurers draft the language in liability policies, which generally are then sold
on a take-it-or leave-it basis. 54 As numerous courts have noted, an important
51

52
53

54

See Cordray, supra note 48, at 36; see also Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV.
1113, 1191–92 (1990) (noting reasons for judicial encouragement of settlement
agreements).
See Squire, supra note 1, at 61–62.
See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Royal Oak v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 912 F.2d 844, 848–49 (6th Cir. 1990)
(explaining that public policy favors enforcing the terms of insurance); Nw. Nat’l. Cas.
Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 444 (5th Cir. 1962) (Gewin, J., concurring) (noting the
public policy favoring the enforcement of contracts); Union Camp Corp. v. Cont’l Cas.
Co., 452 F. Supp. 565, 568 (S.D. Ga. 1978) (“Exercise of the freedom of contract is not
lightly to be interfered with. It is only in clear cases that contracts will be held void as
against public policy.”).
See, e.g., Michelle Boardman, Insuring Understanding: The Tested Language Defense, 95 IOWA L.
REV. 1072, 1091 (2010) (describing the “hyperstandardization” of insurance policies);
Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 125 (2007) (“[I]n
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public policy that applies to insurance “is that an insurance company which accepts
a premium for covering all liability for damages should honor its obligation.”55 As
is discussed above, there are several existing policy provisions that are inconsistent
with a segmented settlement scheme. Thus, in order to avoid running afoul of the
public policy that favors enforcing contracts as written, liability policies would need
to be redrafted before a segmented settlement scheme could be implemented,
particularly in light of the fact that the policyholder has already performed by
paying the policy’s premium when the issue of settlement arises. Consequently, the
entire risk management equation between policyholders, primary insurers and
excess insurers would also need to be changed.
3. The Unfavorable Consequences for Policyholders That Would Occur Under a
Segmented Settlement Scheme
Policyholders, who are seeking to transfer the risk of loss to insurers
when they buy insurance, would also be unpleasantly surprised by the results
of a segmented settlement scheme. Under a segmented settlement scheme,
the contractual relationship between insurers and policyholders would be
quite different because the reasonableness of settlements would be measured
by each individual insurer’s expected trial liability, as opposed to the total
expected liability of the policyholder. 56 Consequently, unless the
policyholder’s liability has been stipulated to by the parties, it would never be
reasonable for the insurer to pay its full policy limits, regardless of which layer
in an insurance program an insurer sits. This is because it will always have
some percentage chance at trial for a defense victory or a damage award for
less than its full policy limits. Thus, under a segmented settlement scheme,
insurers would be free to reject settlements that are reasonable when the case
is valued as a whole because there would be no penalty for deciding not to

55

56

some lines of insurance, all insurance companies provide identical coverage on the same
take-it-or-leave-it basis.”); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, 1 LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT
DISPUTES § 4.06[b] 4–37 (2d ed. 1999) (“In a sense, the typical insurance contract is one
of ‘super-adhesion’ in that the contract is completely standardized and not even reviewed
prior to contract formation.”); James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to
Special Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 996 (1992) (“The
only part of the standard policy that is generally customized to the consumer-insured is
the Declaration Sheet. . . . [T]here is little, if any, freedom to negotiate the standardized
language of the insurance contract that determines the scope of coverage.”).
Creech v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 516 So. 2d 1168, 1174 (La. Ct. App. 1987); see also Sch.
Dist. of Royal Oak, 912 F.2d at 849; McNulty, 307 F.2d at 444; Union Camp, 452 F. Supp. at
568.
See Squire, supra note 1, at 39–40.

7:589 (2013)

Segmented Settlements

607

settle and insurers would never be held liable for more than their policy limits.
As discussed above, such a scenario would create little, if any, incentive for
insurers to settle. Consequently, much more of the burden to fund
settlements would fall to policyholders.
To really understand the shift in settlement burden that would occur
under a segmented settlement scheme, consider another scenario that is more
complex and realistic in shareholder litigation against large corporate
policyholders. Based on the way damages are calculated in shareholder
litigation (the number of outstanding shares are multiplied by the movement
in the stock price caused by the alleged misconduct), 57 assume that the
policyholder faces a potential liability of $1 billion if the shareholders are
successful at trial. Also assume that the policyholder’s primary insurance has a
policy limit of $10 million and the policyholder has additional layers of excess
insurance for a total of $300 million in insurance coverage. 58 Also assume that
the shareholders have a 10% chance of prevailing at trial, which means the
policyholder’s expected liability is $100 million (0.10 x $1B = $100M). Finally,
assume that shareholders are willing to settle for $100 million, the expected
trial value of the case. From the policyholder’s perspective, not only would it
be reasonable to settle for $100 million to avoid a potential liability of $1
billion, it would be indefensible to put $700 million of the policyholder’s and
$200 million of the insurers’ assets at risk by proceeding to trial when the case
could be settled for $100 million. Under the existing policy language and case
law, the primary insurer and the excess insurers up to the $100 million layer
of coverage would be required to consent to the settlement because it would
be unreasonable not to do so. Also, none of the excess insurers above the
$100 million layer would be asked to contribute anything to settle the case
because the entire settlement amount is below their layers of coverage.
Under a segmented settlement scheme where each insurer makes its
settlement decision without regard to any other party’s interests or the current
policy language and law, the reasonable settlement value for all of the insurers
in total would be $30 million (0.10 x $300M = $30M). The policyholder, on
the other hand, would be required to contribute the other $70 million in order
to settle the case for the expected trial value of $100 million (0.10 x $1B =
$100M) even though it has paid premiums for $300 million in coverage.

57
58

BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 34.
According to Tom Baker’s and Sean Griffith’s study, $300 million is the maximum
amount of D&O insurance that large corporations currently purchase. BAKER &
GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 53.
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In short, this example illustrates why a segmented settlement scheme
would be extremely unfavorable to policyholders and would be inconsistent
with the very purpose of insurance – to transfer the risk of loss from
policyholders to insurers.
B. Questions Regarding the Realization of the Benefits of a
Segmented Settlement Scheme
It is questionable whether the principal benefits that a segmented
settlement scheme are intended to produce – avoiding overcompensation of
plaintiffs and lower premiums – would actually occur under such a scheme.
As an initial matter, it is questionable whether plaintiffs are actually
overcompensated due to the existing policy language and laws, as discussed
above in Part I. It is also questionable whether premiums would be lower.
Currently, the premiums charged for primary insurance are much higher
than the premiums charged for excess insurance. 59 Indeed, the higher the
attachment point of an excess insurer, the lower the premium charged for the
same amount of limits. This is because the risk being borne by the higher
layer excess insurers is lower due to the lower chances of a claim reaching the
higher layers of coverage. 60 Because the primary insurer could settle cases for
far less than its policy limits and would have no risk of being held liable for
judgments that exceed its policy limits under a segmented settlement scheme,
the premiums for primary insurance should go down. Conversely, however,
the premiums excess insurers charge would go up because they would be
assuming a greater risk now that they would no longer have the benefit of the
requirements that: (1) lower layers of insurance must be exhausted by the
payment of their full policy limits, and (2) lower layer insurers must accept
settlements that are reasonable from the perspective of the policyholder.
Consequently, the result would simply be a shifting of premium payments
from primary and lower layer excess insurers to higher layer excess insurers.
Would there nonetheless be a net savings in premiums for policyholders
as Professor Squire theorizes? It is unlikely. As an initial matter, shareholders
are already only receiving on average less than 3% of their alleged damages in
the average settlement. 61 Thus, there is no reason to believe that shareholders
would be willing to accept even less to settle cases simply because less
insurance would be available to settle if the policyholder decided not to
59
60
61

See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 21; Marick, supra note 21.
See sources cited supra note 59.
BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 8.

7:589 (2013)

Segmented Settlements

609

purchase additional insurance to make up for the lower amount of insurance
that would be available to settle cases. Consequently, if the policyholder
purchased additional excess insurance to make up for the lost amount of
insurance available to settle cases under a segmented settlement scheme, then
there would not be a net savings in premiums for policyholders. This is
because the policyholder would be using the premium savings, resulting from
lower premiums charged by the primary and low level excess insurers, to
purchase higher layers of insurance in an attempt to replace the “true”
insurance that would be available to fund the payment of claims. Thus, the
only way real savings in premiums would occur is if policyholders chose not
to use the premium savings created by the segmented settlement scheme to
purchase additional insurance, but instead simply funded more of the
settlements with money from their own coffers. Of course, such a result
would be exactly contrary to the very reason that policyholders buy insurance
in the first place. There is consequently little reason to think that
policyholders would choose to become more self-insured simply because the
rules were changed to decrease the amount of insurance actually available in
each layer of coverage to settle cases.
Although Professor Squire favors a scenario in which policyholders
would purchase higher, thinner layers of coverage, 62 such insurance may not
actually be available to purchase due to the capital requirements for insurers.
Professors Baker and Griffith uncovered that the highest total amount of
D&O insurance currently purchased is $300 million. 63 Large corporations,
however, routinely face shareholder lawsuits with alleged damages that far
exceed $300 million, so the end result of a segmented settlement scheme
could be that some policyholders would be forced to become even more selfinsured than they currently are. 64 Further, common sense dictates that if the
amount of insurance available to fund judgments were increased, plaintiffs’
counsel would demand greater amounts to settle. 65
The discussion above also reveals that one of the primary justifications
for the implementation of a segmented settlement scheme is predicated upon
the questionable assumption that corporations are risk neutral or should be
forced to become more risk neutral. Corporations that purchase insurance, by
definition, are not risk neutral. One of the principal reasons corporations
purchase insurance is to avoid the payment of uncertain future losses. 66
62
63
64
65
66

See Squire, supra note 1, at 43.
BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 53.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 144–45 (stating the amount of insurance available impacts settlement amounts).
See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 21, at 10.
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When a company purchases insurance, it is exchanging a relatively small
certain loss (i.e., the premium) in order to transfer the risk of larger, uncertain
future losses to an insurer. 67 If corporations were risk neutral, then they
would simply self-insure. Indeed, even though Professor Squire acknowledges
that it would be cheaper to self-insure for many companies because they
could save the cost of insurers’ profits imbedded in the premiums, most
companies do not. That, of course, is true for many types of insurance and is
not unique to D&O insurance. 68
Ultimately, if the goal of a segmented settlement scheme is to make the
costs associated with shareholder litigation transparent to shareholders by
forcing corporations to become more self-insured for shareholder litigation,
then there is a better and more open way of achieving it. Corporations could
simply be prohibited from purchasing D&O insurance. 69 As Professor Squire

67
68

69

Id.
The reasons many corporations are not risk neutral and choose to purchase insurance
instead of “going bare,” as self-insurance is referred to in the world of insurance, are
generally beyond the scope of this Response, but a few observations on that front are in
order. There are tax advantages for corporations that purchase insurance. Corporations
can deduct premiums as business expenses. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 63. On
the other hand, a corporation that simply puts aside the funds that would be used to pay
premiums into a reserve fund to pay claims would not be able to receive a deduction for
those amounts and the company also would have to pay taxes on the income the reserves
earned. Id. Insurance also protects against the risk of bankruptcy. Id. at 63–64. In addition,
many lenders require corporate borrowers to have insurance so corporations that do not
have insurance incur higher borrowing costs. Id. at 64. Similarly, when a company is
confronting a crisis that creates an uncertain future due to, for example, allegations of
corporate misconduct or a catastrophe such as a flood, the company’s ability to raise
capital is limited and insurance provides a ready source of funds to address such
situations. Id. at 65. Although less applicable to D&O insurance, many companies also
purchase insurance for the loss-prevention expertise of insurers that the companies
themselves lack. Id. at 66. Finally, insurance protects the shareholders’ investments in the
company by lowering the volatility of a company’s share price by smoothing the
company’s profits and losses that otherwise would be impacted by the payments of
settlements and judgments. Id. at 67.
Even though D&O policies contain exclusions that are intended to deny coverage for
intentional misconduct such as fraud, shareholder lawsuits are carefully crafted to plead
around such exclusions. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 30, 49. Nonetheless,
because shareholder lawsuits must be predicated on allegations of deliberate or reckless
corporate misconduct, a public policy argument against allowing insurance for
shareholder lawsuits certainly can be made. See id. Although this Response does not allow
for a fulsome exploration of the argument, for a discussion of the public policies in favor
of and against allowing insurance for intentional injuries or damages, see generally,
Christopher C. French, Debunking the Myth that Insurance Coverage is Not Available or Allowed
for Intentional Torts or Damages, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 65 (2012).
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acknowledges, 70 such a proposal is not novel and it already has
considered and rejected by state legislatures. 71

611
been

III. ANALYSIS OF SEGMENTED SETTLEMENTS UNDER OTHER LINES
OF CORPORATE INSURANCE
Although Professor Squire’s article focuses on D&O insurance, he asserts
that due to the existing rules regarding insurers’ obligations to settle, the risk
of unreasonable “cramdown” settlements and overcompensation of plaintiffs
in lawsuits against corporations may also exist under other lines of
insurance. 72 Consequently, he suggests that segmented settlements be
considered for such lines of insurance as well. 73 The case law and my
experience indicate that there is little risk of unreasonable “cramdown”
settlements or overcompensation of plaintiffs under other lines of corporate
insurance. 74
As an example, let us consider the typical experience of a major
corporation with CGL insurance, a line of insurance that most large
corporations have. As an initial matter, the policies typically are occurrencebased, as opposed to claims-made policies like D&O insurance. 75 The
distinction is important because occurrence-based policies are triggered when
an injury or damage takes place during the policy period, while claims-made
policies cover claims first presented during the policy period. 76 Thus, claims
often trigger multiple policy periods under occurrence-based policies, while
claims typically only trigger a single policy period under claims-made policies.
As such, a lot more insurance is often potentially available to cover CGL
claims. 77
In addition, because most large corporations in America are willing to
bear some risk in order to save on the higher costs of premiums for primary
and low level excess insurance, their insurance programs often have a
significant self-insured retention (“SIR”) with only excess insurance above
70
71
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See Squire, supra note 1, at 64.
BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 43–44.
See Squire, supra note 1, at 70, 72–73.
Id.
See supra notes 25–27.
See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 21, at 482–85.
Id.
Id. See also Christopher C. French, The “Non-Cumulation Clause”: An “Other Insurance Clause”
by Another Name, 60 KAN. L. REV. 375, 378–85 (2011) (analyzing the complexities in
determining the amount each insurer should be obligated to pay when a claim triggers
coverage in multiple years and multiple layers of coverage).
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it. 78 Consequently, similar to D&O insurance, the policyholder controls the
defense and settlement of cases asserted against it. Also, insurers’ obligations
to pay the defense costs, settlements and judgments arise as indemnity
obligations, because such amounts are included as covered costs under the
definition of “ultimate net loss” that insurers agree to pay. 79 And, similar to
the D&O insurance policy language discussed above, the policyholder must
obtain the consent of the insurer in order to settle, and that consent shall be
reasonably given. 80
A graphic depiction of three years in a typical corporate insurance
program for CGL insurance that has a total of $300 million in limits in the
highest year with a $50 million SIR is set forth below.
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79

80

See, e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 996 A.2d 1254, 1255 (Del.
2010) (analyzing coverage issues for a policyholder that was self-insured for losses up to
$50 million with excess insurance above that amount); Douglas R. Richmond, Rights and
Responsibilities of Excess Insurers, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 29, 29 (2000) (“Larger businesses
often self-insure up to some amount, with their self-insured retentions (SIRs) substituting
for primary insurance.”).
See, e.g., Planet Ins. Co v. Mead Reinsurance Corp., 789 F.2d 668, 671 (1986) (finding the
term “Ultimate Net Loss” is defined as “(1) The sum actually paid or payable in cash in
the settlement or satisfaction of losses for which the insured is liable either by
adjudication or compromise with the written consent of the ‘Company’, after making
proper deduction for all recoveries and salvages collectible, (2) and includes attorney's
fees, court costs and interest on any judgment or award, (3) but excludes all loss
adjustment expenses and all salaries of employees and office expenses of the insured, the
‘Company’ or any underlying insurer so incurred.”).
See, e.g., Fuller-Austin Installation Co. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 135 Cal. App. 4th 958, 982
(2006); Taylor v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 978 P.2d 740, 747 (Haw. 1999); Hilco Capital, LP
v. Fed. Ins. Co., 978 A.2d 174, 179 (Del. 2009); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bear Stearns Cos., 10
N.Y.3d 170, 177 (N.Y. 2008); RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 10, at § 203:37.
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Notably, unlike many D&O insurance programs,81 multiple insurers often
share a single layer of coverage. 82
In order to illustrate how claims are defended and settled under a typical
CGL program for a corporate policyholder, we will consider two actual
experiences of DuPont, a Fortune 100 company, which are matters of public
record. The first experience involved a products liability case related to an
acetal resin product known as Delrin. 83 It is a case that I ultimately tried on
behalf of DuPont against the final insurer holdout, Stonewall Insurance
Company, after a decade of litigation.
In the Delrin case, DuPont manufactured plastic resin pellets in the 1980s
that were used by a plumbing manufacturer to create fittings used in
plumbing systems. 84 Years after the plumbing systems were installed, it was
discovered that the fittings slowly degraded allegedly due to chemical attack
by elements commonly found in household water such as chlorine. 85
Consequently, some of the plumbing systems in which the fittings were used
eventually leaked and caused damage to the homes. 86
Numerous lawsuits were filed on behalf of hundreds of thousands of
homeowners against various defendants, including the designer and
manufacturers of the plumbing systems as well as several manufacturers of
the raw materials used in the systems such as DuPont. 87 DuPont had an
insurance program in the 1980s with a $50 million SIR and excess coverage
above the SIR in each year, which is very similar to the insurance program
depicted in Figure 1. 88 Because the claims implicated multiple years of
insurance, DuPont provided notice of the lawsuits to dozens of its CGL
insurers in multiple policy years and then kept its insurers apprised of the
defense strategy as well as potential settlement opportunities during the
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BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 148.
See, e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co., 996 A.2d at 1255; E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 879 A.2d 929, 933 (Del. Super. Ct. 2004); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., No. 99C-12-253 JTV, 2006 WL2338045 *1, *4 (Del. Super. Ct. July 31,
2006), aff’d, Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 933 A.2d 1250
(Del. 2007); Richmond, supra note 77, at 29.
See Stonewall Ins. Co., 996 A.2d. 1254 (Del. 2010).
See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 879 A.2d 929, 933 (Del. Super.
Ct. 2004).
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Id. at 933–34.
Id. at 935.
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course of the litigation. 89 Although invited to do so during the course of the
litigation, no insurer provided any input to DuPont regarding how the cases
should be defended or whether, and for how much, the cases should be
settled. Although none of the insurers had any basis to contend that the
proposed settlements were unreasonable, the insurers neither consented nor
objected to the settlements that were proposed. DuPont ultimately settled by
agreeing to pay a 10% share of all the amounts paid by the group of
defendants to the underlying claimants. 90 DuPont’s total costs associated
with the defense and settlement of the cases exceeded $239 million. 91
While DuPont was spending tens of millions of dollars defending itself,
the insurers reserved their rights and asserted dozens of defenses to coverage
that were largely based on arguments that insurers in other years should pay
instead of them, as opposed to defenses that were based upon arguments that
the claims at issue were not actually covered under the terms of their
policies. 92 Thus, DuPont was left to fund the hundreds of millions of dollars
of settlements on its own and subsequently sued its insurers to recover the
amount it spent to defend and settle the cases.
The second experience relates to DuPont’s efforts to collect from its
insurers for its asbestos liabilities. It is another case in which I represented
DuPont. As was the case with many companies in America, although DuPont
did not make asbestos-containing products, asbestos was present at some of
its manufacturing plants. Consequently, DuPont was sued by thousands of
contractors who allegedly were exposed to asbestos while working at
DuPont’s plants. 93 Similar to the Delrin case, DuPont notified its insurers of
the underlying lawsuits and kept them informed regarding the defense
strategy and potential settlement opportunities. Nonetheless, none of the
insurers agreed to pay any of the defense costs or settlements, with each
insurer claiming that other insurers should pay instead. 94 As a result, DuPont
paid millions of dollars to defend and settle the cases over the course of many
years and then sued its insurers to recover the amounts it had paid, focusing
89
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See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 99C-12-253 JTV, 2006
WL2338045 *1, *4 (Del. Super. Ct. July 31, 2006), aff’d, Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 933 A.2d 1250 (Del. 2007).
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2004).
Stonewall Ins. Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 996 A.2d 1254, 1256 (Del. 2010).
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 879 A.2d 929, 936–37 (Del. Super.
Ct. 2004).
See Complaint at ¶ 24, E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co. v. Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co., et.
al., (No. B-0176143) (Dist. Ct. Jefferson County, Texas, Nov. 23, 2005).
Id. at ¶ 36.
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its coverage claim on the insurers that had sold DuPont policies from 1967 to
1972. 95 After DuPont defeated the insurers’ motion for summary judgment,
the insurers finally settled. 96
What are the lessons from these two examples of DuPont’s experience
with respect to the issues of whether multi-layered towers of insurance lead to
unreasonable “cramdown” settlements and the overcompensation of the
underlying plaintiffs? There are several.
First, despite the insurers’ obligation to consent to reasonable
settlements, none of the insurers actually consented to any of the settlements
even though they ultimately could not successfully contest the reasonableness
of them. Obviously, that means the higher layer excess insurers were not
overly eager to settle, and they did not “cramdown” unreasonable settlements
on the lower layer insurers. Nor did any of the insurers feel compelled to
tender their policy limits in order to avoid being held liable for more than the
policy’s limits. To the contrary, none of the insurers wanted to settle, not
because they contended the underlying cases lacked merit or the settlements
were unreasonable, but rather, principally because DuPont had multiple
policy years that covered the claims and each of the insurers were hoping
other insurers would be required to pay in its stead. They also preferred to
continue holding and investing the premiums paid by DuPont while DuPont
spent its own money on the litigation. 97 Consequently, DuPont had to sue
them to collect anything and then had to overcome numerous coverage
defenses that were intended to eliminate, or reduce, the insurers’ coverage
obligations.
Second, the existence of a multi-layered insurance program, and the
purported coercive effect of the legal and contractual obligation of insurers to
accept reasonable settlements, did not result in the overcompensation of the
claimants. To the contrary, DuPont and the underlying claimants negotiated
the settlements without regard to whether DuPont’s insurance would cover
the settlements because the availability of insurance was uncertain when the
settlements were negotiated.
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Id. at ¶ 28.
See Hearing Transcript at 18, E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co. v. Travelers Cas. and Sur.
Co., et. al., (No. B-0176143) (Dist. Ct. Jefferson County, Texas, Oct. 6, 2006).
See, e.g., Eliot M. Blake, Rumors of Crisis: Considering the Insurance Crisis and Tort Reform in an
Information Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401, 422–23 (1988) (“Insurers do not simply hang onto
premiums, of course; they invest them for the time period between payment of premiums
and payment of losses. . . . The role of investment income in the [insurance] industry is
particularly important. Studies have concluded that investment income allows the industry
to remain profitable as a whole even with significant negative underwriting losses.”).
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Third, DuPont’s experiences are not unusual. In complex, multimillion
dollar lawsuits against corporate policyholders, it is quite common to find that
multiple layers and years of insurance potentially cover the claims and that the
insurers rarely are eager to settle regardless of which layer of coverage they
occupy. 98 Indeed, a policyholder must often make settlement decisions
without any input from insurers and the policyholder must fund the
settlements itself and later pursue its insurers; thus, collective settlements are
not pervasive. 99 Indeed, collective or segmented settlements would actually
be an impediment to the settlement process. Under such a system, instead of
negotiating with just the policyholder, the underlying plaintiffs would need to
negotiate separately with dozens of insurers, each of which evaluates the
underlying plaintiffs’ chances of success at trial differently and expects a
discount off its policy limits for its coverage defenses.
In short, under other lines of insurance such as CGL insurance purchased
by large corporations, there is little risk of either overcompensation to the
underlying claimants in complex, high stakes litigation, or coercive
“cramdown” settlements on lower layer insurers due to the insurers’
obligation to consent to reasonable settlements. Thus, overcompensation and
“cramdown” settlements are not pervasive problems that need to be
addressed by changing the policy language or laws related to settlements. To
the contrary, although outside the scope of this Response, more incentives to
induce insurers to accept reasonable settlements need to be created because
insurers currently often refuse to do so without negative financial
consequences.
CONCLUSION
Professor Squire’s article represents a significant advancement in the
scholarly literature on insurance law. He has coined the previously unnamed
“duty to contribute” to describe insurers’ obligations to pay the amounts of
reasonable settlements that implicate their layers of coverage. He also has
identified a theoretical situation in which excess insurers may have an
economic incentive, but not a contractual obligation, to overpay the plaintiffs
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See French, supra note 77. See also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No.
99C-12-253 JTV, 2006 WL2338045 *1, *4 (Del. Super. Ct. July 31, 2006), aff’d, Travelers
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 933 A.2d 1250 (Del. 2007); Comerica
Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 498 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1034 (E.D. Mich. 2007); Aylward,
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in order to settle. He then identifies and discusses a novel solution to address
this problem, which he calls “segmented settlements.”
Although there are some very limited circumstances in which an excess
insurer theoretically might be tempted to overpay despite its contractual
obligation to only pay reasonable amounts to settle based upon the
policyholder’s expected trial liability, in practice insurers do not intentionally
overpay in order to settle. In addition, changing to a segmented settlement
scheme would create a number of complex, practical problems that are
inconsistent with some important public policies. Such a scheme would
require significant changes to the existing policy language and would lead to
more trials with “empty chair” defendants. Thus, considering the limited
theoretical circumstances in which the temptation to overpay could arise, and
weighing the problems that would accompany a change to a segmented
settlement scheme against the benefits such a change is intended to confer,
the scales tip against implementing a segmented settlement scheme.

